

VZCZCXRO6415
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #1427/01 3491217
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151217Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1036
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUZFMXI/CDR USTRANSCOM INTEL CELL SCOTT AFB IL
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2238

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 001427

SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/TIA/ITA, DS/T/ATA, S/CT
CENTCOM FOR J5, SOCCENT J3, SOCCENT CEG
DIA FOR DHO-2

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: [PTER](#) [ASEC](#) [TI](#)
SUBJECT: JIHAD DECLARED AGAINST OMON

REF: A: DUSHANBE 1016; B: DUSHANBE 1211

CLASSIFIED BY: Kenneth Gross, Ambassador, Exec, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: OMON (Militia Special Purpose Detachment)
Commander Colonel Makhmadshoev Khurshed believes that the IMU
declared a jihad against OMON in retaliation for the killing of
suspected IMU militants. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (C) During a recent meeting with the RSO, Colonel Khurshed
described a series of reprisal attacks by the IMU that started
after OMON first engaged suspected IMU militants in the
Tavildara region during the May to August time frame. Colonel
Khurshed formed his theory that the IMU declared a jihad against
OMON after a failed Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attack
against OMON personnel in the northern city of Khujand. On
November 8, a low-order IED detonation occurred under an OMON
vehicle. The explosive train of the IED was initiated by a
radio receiver and electrical blasting cap. The blasting cap
detonated but failed to initiate the main charge. According to
a post-blast investigation, the electrical blasting cap somehow
fell out of the bucket containing the main charge. The main
charge was two kg of ammonium nitrate mixed with aluminum powder
and diesel fuel.

[1](#)3. (C) A timeline of events in this alleged tit-for-tat chain of
attacks is as follows:

-- May to August 2009: OMON is dispatched to the Tavildara
region of Tajikistan to conduct direct action operations against
suspected IMU militants that allegedly infiltrated into
Tajikistan from Afghanistan. OMON snipers reportedly killed 12
IMU militants.

-- September (exact day unknown): OMON kills a suspected IMU
bomb maker in Afghono village (outskirts of Dushanbe).
Investigators find hand written instructions (allegedly from
Afghanistan) describing how to build an IED at the bomb maker's
residence, in addition to material and information regarding
military explosive devices, electrical schematics, powdered
charcoal, an AK-47, 7.62 mm ammunition, hand grenades, and
money.

-- September 18: Alleged IMU militants assassinate the Police Chief in Isfara, in northern Tajikistan.

-- October 18: Tajik police (including members of the OMON detachment) raid a house in Isfara allegedly housing IMU militants responsible for the assassination of the Isfara police chief. They kill four suspected IMU militants. One OMON officer is wounded in the arm.

¶4. (C) Comment: It is difficult to establish that the IMU declared jihad against OMON or that the IMU intends to specifically target OMON, as the Colonel believes. Post routinely receives reports of IMU activity and host nation police action against IMU militants in Tajikistan from OMON and other sources. Attempts to corroborate these reports are rarely successful. The RSO requested to see the alleged IED that was found in Khujand. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (OMON's parent organization) denied the request on the basis that the IED was still in Khujand, a 12-hour drive from Dushanbe. The Ministry provided photos of the IED, but they were of such poor quality as to not be useful in identifying any of the IED components.

¶5. (C) Comment Continued: The Tajik government regularly pins responsibility for such incidents on a "foreign" enemy, the IMU, rather than admit that homegrown grievances may play a role. These incidents could be related to the IMU, or could be the

DUSHANBE 00001427 002 OF 002

results of local grievances or criminal disputes. End Comment.

¶6. (U) The point of contact for this and all security related information at Post is Regional Security Officer Erik Olerud.
GROSS